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PROVISIONSAFFECTiNG
TAX LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES
Special provisions of the tax law have had a varying influence on the
functional components of income. Some provisions have affected all
components, others only a single one. Those provisions which have, in
the main or exclusively, affected the taxation of employment income are
considered below. Among these, the more prominent are withholding of
tax at source, excludable sick pay, allowance for child care of working
mothers, deferred compensation, payment in kind at the convenience
of the employer, and the erstwhile earned-income credit. Not all had a
significant effect on tax liability; some were deemed important for the
policy issues they raised rather than for their current effect on tax
liabilities.
Witholding at Source
Withholding, already touched upon in Chapter 2, was not intended to
affect the amount of tax liability but merely the timing and administra-
tion of tax payments. Although in recent proposals in favor of with-
holding of tax on dividends and interest improved coverage 1wasthe
dominant consideration, it was neither the primary motive for nor a
significant effect of the introduction of withholding on wages and sala-
ries.2 Before the introduction of withholding, i.e., before 1943, mdi-
1Seethe President's Tax Message of April 20, 1961, as reprinted in House
Document No. 140, pp. 8—9.
2Inthe Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1943 (P. 85),
threereasons for the enactment of withholding are advanced: first, to prevent
hardship to those "not accustomed to yearly budgeting"—an allusion to the
problem of meeting the tax liability on a year's income in one lump-sum payment;
second, the increase in flexibility of the income tax as a countercyclical tool if
changes in rates could be made effective shortly after enactment; and third, the
greater assurance of collection that was expected to result from withholding
(which presumably refers both to prevention of default and to complete reportingPROViSIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILiTY 49
viduals were not required to pay tax in advance of filing the final return
for the taxable year (for most persons, between January 1 and March 15
at that time). As long as the income tax concerned only a relatively
small, high-income segment of the population, and rates were mild when
judged by later standards, payment of tax in one lump sum caused no
widespread problem. But after the outbreak of the Second World War,
rates were increased, exemptions were lowered, and incomes rose rapidly.
The income tax had changed within a short time span from a tax on a
few to a mass tax. As a result, the need to set aside sufficient funds to
meet a year's tax liability created problems for many of the new tax-
payers, who were not accustomed to accounting and saving in advance
of requirements. An obvious solution was to move collections closer to
the time of accrual. Up to 1966, this was accomplished by requiring
employers to withhold a fixed percentage of all wages in excess of the
employee's exemptions. In addition, quarterly payments on the basis
of estimated tax were required of all taxpayers for whom withholding
falls short of final annual tax liability by more than a stated amount.3
As a consequence of the current payment system adopted in 1943,
taxpayers as a group have been ahead of schedule in paying taxes in
seven out of eleven years since 1954, instead of lagging anywhere from
one to more than fourteen months behind accruals. Aggregate "over-
payments" by some taxpayers and "underpayments" by others are shown
annually for 1943—64 in Table 17. Overpayment results when the
combined amount of tax withheld and quarterly payments on estimated
tax (if any) exceed final tax liability for the year. Underpayment is the
amount of tax still owed at the time of filing.
(coverage) of income). In the Treasury's explanatory statement on the 1964
Act, only the first reason for withholding is cited: "The purpose of withholding
Federal income taxes on wages and salariesisto distribute the payment of
such taxes throughout the year rather than in one lump sum." Treasury Depart-
ment, Summaries of Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1964, Washington, 1964,
TP-8, p.1.
Withholding rates were set so as to approximate tax liability at the first-
bracket rate on the amount above exemptions on the assumption of a standard
deduction of 10 per cent. From 1954 until 1963 the withholding rate on wages
and salaries was 18 per cent on all amounts in excess of a weekly exemption
of $13 per person. Under the 1964 Act the withholding rate was reduced to
14 percent, but in May 1966 five steps were added to the existing 14 per cent
rate and the exemption was raised. (For rates, see Appendix E.) Taxpayers whose
current payments on account of withholding fall short of their estimated tax
liability by $40 or more must file a "Declaration of Estimated Income Tax"
and make quarterly payments in advance of filing the annual income tax return.50 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
TABLE 17
Amount of Overpayment and Underpayment in Relation to
Total Income Tax Liability, 1943—64
(dollars in billions)
Overpayment TotalIncomeCol.ICol.2
(refunds plusUnderpaymentTax Liability + ±
Year credits) (tax due) (aftercredits)Cot.3Col.3
. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1943 0.66 2.74 14.58 .05 .19
1944 1.36 2.41 16.35 .08 .15
1945 1.83 2.41 17.22 .11 .14
1946 1.94 2.74 16.28 .12 .17
1947 1.97 3.01 18.24 .11 .16
1948 2.68 2.21 15.62 .17 .14
1949 1.96 2.12 14.68 .13 .14
1950 2.07 3.11 18.58 .11 .17
1951 2.54 3.72 24.44 .10 .15
1952 2.93 3.60 28.04 .10 .13
1952a 2.93 3.60 27.80 .11 .13
1953 3.28 3.38 29.43 .11 .11
1954 3.72 3.02 26.67 .14 .11
1955 3.61 3.78 29.61 .12 .13
1956 3.98 4.10 32.73 .12 .13
1957 4.52 3.94 34.39 .13 .11
1958 4.80 4.09 34.34 .14 .12
1959 5.11 5.08 38.64 .13 .13
1960 5.69 4.75 39.46 .14 .12
1961 5.98 5.67 42.23 .14 .13
1962 6.58 5.62 44.90 .15 .12
1963 6.94 6.27 48.20 .14 .13
1964 5.89 7.07 47.15 .12 .15
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income.
included from '1952 on.
Until 1953, total underpayments tended to exceed overpayments.
From 1954 on, the opposite has been evident. Overpayments in 1962
were $6.6 billion, underpayments $5.6 billion. In 1964, overpayments
were less than underpayments, but this is because the 1964 Act pro-
vided for tax reduction in two steps, spread over two successive years,
whereas the withholding rate was lowered immediately by the fullPROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LiABILITY 51
amount, thereby causing more taxpayers to experience underwithhold-
ing than normally would have at the new rate schedule. Beginning in
May 1966, a graduated withholding system was adopted whose rates
extended from 14 to 30 per cent in six steps. By itself this would have
resulted in more overwithholding than previously. To avoid it, the basic
withholding exemption was increased from $676 to $700 at an annual
rate, and the first $200 of wages above the exemption became subject
to a zero withholding rate. Withholding for most married couples and
single persons with AGI over $7,600 who elect the standard deduction
will be less than final tax liability for the year. For those working less
than a full year, overwithholding may continue to result whenever there
is little or no income from other sources.*
The difference between overpayments and underpayments, in the
aggregate, has in most years not exceeded $1 billion. Current payments
of taxpayers whose actual income exceeded their estimate based on
previous years' income have tended to fall short of final liabilities unless
their income was substantially wages and salaries and did not exceed
the first bracket of taxable income. For a taxpayer with the two last-
named characteristics, an increase in income would not result in under-
withholding. Similarly, a decrease in income might not result in over-
withholding as long as a taxpayer stayed within the first bracket in all
pay periods. However, if he missed one or more pay periods, overwith-
holding 'would quite probably be the result. In principle, current under-
payment by some who underestimated might be expected to be balanced
by current overpayment by others who experienced unforeseen decreases
in income. For the system as a whole, underpayments and overpayments
might thus be expected to cancel out in years when economic activity
exhibits no exceptional advances or declines.4
Furthermore, the occurrence of underpayment and overpayment might
be expected to have no predictable relation to income source. One would,
of course, expect to find a bias toward overpayments at the lower end
of the annual income distribution, and one in favor of underpayment at
the upper end. This follows from the premise that those who have favor-
The observation that overpayments and underpayments approximately balance
in many years may have been the basisfor the Treasury's statement that
"generally, the total amount withheld over a year approximately equals a person's
tax liability." Treasury Department, Summaries of Provisions in theRevenue
Act of 1964.
*Preliminary1966 data show overpayments of $8.65 billion, underpayments of
$7.61 billion. The number of returns were 49.4 million and 17.8 million respec-
tively.52 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
able surprises tend to underpay whereas those whose income falls short
of the estimate tend to overpay. But the distribution of overpayment
and underpayment would otherwise show no bias as to income source
or type of tax payment.
However, bias in the distribution of overpayments by income source
is likely to occur when the current payment system consists of withhold-
ing on one source and quarterly payments on estimated tax on other
sources. This is especially so when, as was true until 1966, the with-
holding rate is not graduated and determined on the assumption that the
standard deduction applies. For all taxpayers with deductions in excess
of the allowable minimum and taxable income confined to the first
bracket, overwithholding was predetermined. Predetermined overwith-
holding was also, in effect, restricted to taxpayers with wages and
salaries, especially seasonal workers, as in the building trades, logging,
and the clothing industry. Tables 18 and 19 show that the distribution
of over- and underpayment has not occurred randomly in the past.
Table 18 shows that in 1959 over 90 per cent of overpayments
occurred on returns with tax withheld, the rest on returns with only
quarterly declarations. However, 52 per cent of underpayments was
TABLE 18
Amount of Overpayment and Underpayment of Tax by Type of





Amount of overpayment 5,1 11 100.0 3,282 100.0
Returns with withholding only 4,160 81.4 2,562 78.1
Returns with withholding and
quarterly payments 453 8.9 305 9.3
Returns with quarterly payments only 497 9.7 415 12.6
Amount of underpayment 5,077 100.0 3,382 100.0
Returns with withholding only 1,255 24.7 971 28.7
Returns with withholding and
quarterly payments 1,166 23.0 649 19.2
Returns with quarterly payments only1,582 31.2 1,013 30.0
Returns with no current payments 1,075 21.2 749 22.1
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income.PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LiABILITY 53
TABLE 19
Number of Returns with Overpayment and Underpayment, 1943—64
(number in millions)
With With TotalCol. 1 ±Cot. 2—
YearOverpaymentUnderpaymentFiled Col.3 Cot.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1943 16.0 15.9 43.7 .37 .36
1944 22.9 22.6 47.1 .49 .48
1945 33.5 14.5 49.9 .67 .29
1946 34.4 13.6 52.8 .65 .26
1947 33.0 15.3 55.1 .60 .28
1948 38.4 8.1 52.1 .74 .16
1949 30.2 13.8 51.8 .58 .27
1950 32.0 14.3 53.1 .60 .27
1951 31.0 18.6 55.4 .56 .34
1952 32.1 19.3 56.5 .57 .34
1953 32.7 19.0 57.8 .57 .33
1954 35.2 16.6 56.7 .62 .29
1955 35.4 18.7 58.2 .61 .32
1956 36.1 19.4 59.2 .61 .33
1957 37.6 18.6 59.8 .63 .31
1958 37.4 18.1 59.1 .63 .31
1959 38.4 19.1 60.3 .64 .32
1960 39.4 18.2 61.0 .65 .30
1961 40.0 18.6 61.5 .65 .30
1962 40.9 18.7 62.7 .65 .30
1963 41.4 19.3 63.9 .65 .30
1964 39.3 22.5 65.4 .60 .34
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income.
accounted for by returns with no withholding and only 48 per cent by
returns with it. Since only wages and salaries are subject to withhold-
ing, and all other income payments require quarterly declarations of
estimated tax,itcan be concluded that overpayment was largely
accounted for by returns with wages and salaries, whereas the larger
part of underpayments occurred on returns with little or no wages and
salaries.5 Further evidence that the distribution of over- and under-
The percentages cited to suggest this conclusion are on the conservative side.
Returns with both withholding and quarterly payments were counted as employee
income returns. If they were omitted from the comparison, wage and salary54 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
payments is not the result of random errors is seen in Table 19. Since
1954 the frequency of returns with overpayment has been regularly
twice as great as that for underpayment. In the absence of any particular
bias, the number of overpayments should exceed the number of under-
payments when actual incomes fall short of taxpayers' estimated in-
comes, and vice versa when actual incomes exceed estimated incomes.
That the number with overpayment has in every year been large com-
pared to that with underpayment, and that the average overpayment is
small compared to the average underpayment,6 is consistent with the
hypothesis that overpayments have been concentrated on returns with
wages or salary and taxable income in the first bracket and underpay-
ments on returns with relatively little employment income, or returns
in general that fall into high brackets.
Overpayment of tax, although eventually corrected by appropriate
refund, results in some advantage to the Treasury. Underpayment, al-
though there is an eventual payment of tax due, is an advantage to the
taxpayer. Where there is a temporary overpayment, the Treasury in
effect obtains an interest-free short-term loan from the individuals con-
cerned. Conversely, where there is temporary underpayment, the tax-
payers concerned have the use of short-term funds interest-free. Since
interest-free loans to taxpayers will eventually result in higher taxes, and
interest-free loans from taxpayers in lower taxes, it follows that if one
group consistently borrows while another consistently lends, the taxes
on the first group are somewhat overstated and on the second group
somewhat understated. The size of the resulting transfer depends on the
level of the appropriate interest rates.
If one applies the Treasury's penalty rate of 6 per cent,7 the 1961
returns would account for 81 per cent of overpayment and only 25 per cent
of underpayinent in 1959. The proportions for other returns remain unchanged.
Similar results are obtained for other years, as can be observed from the 1953
data included in Table 18.
6 Thisisevident ifitisrecalled that the dollar aggregates of over- and
underpayment are nearly equal (Table 17), whereas the respective frequencies
are not.
7 The Treasury charges 6 per cent interest on tax payments made after the
legal payment date. Itis also required to pay interest at 6 per cent on over-
payment of tax on which refund is not made "within 45 days after the last date
prescribed for filing the return." See Internal Revenue Code, 1954, Chap. 67,
Sees. 6601—6602, 6611—6612.
The choice of the Treasury's "penalty" rate in this context is arbitrary. To
the Treasury the funds borrowed at short term are not worth 6 per cent since
it has been able to borrow at lower rates. To the taxpayer the cost may bePROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILiTY 55
TABLE 20





Temporary overpayments of tax 5,437 546
interest imputed on overpayment (6%) —254 —22
Temporary underpayments of tax 2,702 2,965
interest imputed on underpayments(6%) 144 169
Net interest cost (—)orgain (+) —110 147
Source: See Appendix E.
net interest cost to taxpayers with wages and salaries on account of
overpayment was $110 million (Table 20). On the other hand, a net
interest saving of $147 million for 1961 must be imputed to taxpayers
with only other income. Against the background of total tax liability
for 1961 ($42.2 billion) and the total amounts of under- and overpay-
ments, these figures seem very small. This is partly because the interest
estimates cited are the net amounts for each group of taxpayers and
partly because of the relatively short time periods involved.8
An interest burden was presumed on those who overpay and an im-
puted interest offset to tax liability for those who underpay. This is of
course not consistent wtih the theory that many taxpayers typically con-
sider their overpayments a means by which to force themselves to save.
Some are said to understate exemptions deliberately so as to bring about
overwithholding. In that case taxpayers, far from demanding interest,
are willing to pay (in interest forgone) for the service of having their
savings "forced" in equal monthly installments. A close analogy is
more than 6 per cent if he finds it necessary to borrow for his personal needs
until refund is made. For instance, new-auto sales finance rates charged by
four large companies were on average 12.4 per cent per annum in 1961. See
R. P. Shay, New Automobile Finance Rates, New York, NBER, Table 8. Paul
Smith finds gross finance charges for 1959 on various types of consumer credit
ranging from 9 per cent to 24 per cent. See Cost of Providing Consumer Credit,
New York, NBER, Table 1.
8 Interest was computed on the assumption that overpayments occurred in
twelve equal monthly installments so that, depending on when refund was made,
the average overpayment period varied between six and ten months. Similar
assumptions were made regarding underpayments. For detail, see Appendix E.56 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATiON UNDER THE INCOME TAX
participation in the familiar annual Christmas Club.° This explanation
of tax-payment patterns implies that employees have a lower time prefer-
ence for money than other taxpayers. Accordingly, nonemployees
(strictly speaking, those with relatively little wages and salaries) find
uses for their funds which outweigh any value they may see in the sav-
ings feature of overwithholding.
The change from a flat to a graduated withholding rate in 1966 will
undoubtedly affect the distribution and relative amounts of temporary
over- and underpayments. For some taxpayers, the former is even likely
to increase; for many more, underpayments are expected to decrease.
But it is very difficult to predict how great the effect on the respective
balances will be.
Earnings of Married Women
In principle, the wages and salaries of working wives are not different
from any other employment income, and therefore do not require dis-
tinctive tax treatment. The main difference between wives working out-
side the home and all other persons is that the former could otherwise
generate considerable income in the home. They have therefore high
opportunity costs to consider when seeking employment outside the
home. Such opportunity costs exist for all persons, maleorfemale,
but they are especially significant for mothers with children of preschool
age. Like food, clothing, and shelter, child care and related household
chores are a basic necessity for a family with small children, and at least
an important consumption item for other families with children. Provi-
sion of these services in our society is closely associated with the female
spouse—hence the assertion that her opportunity costs vis-à-vis the
market are high—but they could of course be, and sometimes are, per-
formed by the male spouse, suggesting that the opportunity cost equal
In some isolated cases, Christmas Clubs are administered by employers on
behalf of employees. Funds paid in are at the employer's disposal until Christmas
without interest charge to him, thus completing the analogy to overwithholding
of tax.
10Manyservicesthatareordinarily purchased by families,suchasdry
cleaning, home repairs and improvements, haircuts, and so forth, can also be
produced in the home by the consumer himself. Persons who choose to allocate
their time in this manner forgo some of the advantages of specialization in
favor of consuming their own services. But regardless of whether a person
consumes his own services or purchases them with income earned outside the
home, the first alternative is one of his opportunity costs.PROVISIONS AFFECTiNG EMPLOYEE LIABiLITY 57
to the money's worth of housework is not a uniquely female problem.
Ideally an income tax would include such home-generated income in
the tax base. If it does not, persons who take full advantage of special-
ization, and therefore purchase housekeeping and child-care services
from others, suffer a tax disadvantage. As long as the income a house-
wife generates in the home is no less 11thanshe would earn through
employment outside it, she is clearly better off by not entering the labor
market. Her home-produced services are now tax-free, whereas her
income from outside employment would be taxed and therefore would
not suffice to purchase services equivalent to those she produced in the
home. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that domestic services pur-
chased are independent of husband's income, for a family spending
$3,500 yearly for housekeeping and child care, the amounts a wife
needs to earn at 1967 tax rates to replace herself in the home vary as
follows with husband's income: 12




As the above figures illustrate, a wife's breakeven income rises as
family income rises. This is because under ordinary circumstances it is
to a couple's advantage to file a joint return, which since 1948 has per-
mitted husbands and wives to split their combined income. The rate of
tax applicable to a wife's labor market earnings is therefore equal to,
or somewhat higher than, the marginal rate of tax applicable to the
family's income without her earnings. The higher the husband's income,
the higher the marginal rate on any labor market earnings of the wife
and hence the greater the amount she needs to earn to break even.
A solution equitable to all taxpayers would require inclusion of the
money's worth of home-produced income in the tax base. This would
increase the equity of the tax as well as its neutrality with respect to
allocation of effort between home and market production. The practical
difficulties in the way of this solution are obvious, have been stated be-
Measured by what the family would have to pay to obtain similar services,
such as baby sitting, housecleaning, and cooking, from a hired person.
12Thecomputations are based on the assumption that the couple had two
dependent children and filed a joint return on which deductions equal to 10
per cent were claimed.58 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
fore, and therefore need not be repeated here.13 A type of solution
which moves in the opposite direction, but which has wide appeal, is
to allow wives who work outside the home a deduction roughly equal
to the minimum cost of obtaining housekeeping services. Such a de-
duction may be granted to all wives employed outside the home, as in
the case of the British income tax cited by Vickrey,'4 or it may be re-
stricted to actual cash outlays for certain domestic help, as in the U.S.
income tax since The first proposal appears intended to com-
pensate employed wives for the lack of tax-free imputed income which
they could have generated in the home. The second emphasizes the
hardship experienced when housekeeping and child care services are
purchased out of low incomes.
To compensate only wives employed outside the home for the tax-
free income obtained by housewives is an incomplete measure from an
equity point of view. The basic equity criterion underlying the income
tax is the equal treatment of equals, not merely the equal treatment of
families with married females. Yet the latter is implied by the provision
of an allowance for working wives: it fails to take into account that an
allowance equal to the value of housewives' services granted to families
with married women discriminates against all single taxpayers who have
no imputed income from wives' housework. This difficulty has also been
noted by Vickrey,'-6 who proposed to take account of the advantage
enjoyed by families in which one spouse stays at home by granting
them a smaller exemption, which in effect would constitute an implicit
valuation of the wife's industry in the home. To take account of part-
time employment outside the home, the exemption is increased by a
fraction of the smaller of the amounts earned by each spouse until it
reaches a level such as might "for tax purposes be assumed to indicate
full-time employment." 17
13 Seeespecially the excellent discussion by Donald B. Marsh, "The Taxation
of Imputed Income," Political Science Quarterly, December 1943, pp. 514—521;
also William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, New York, 1947, pp.
44—52, and Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, Chicago, 1938, pp.
110—112.
14Agendafor Progressive Taxation, p. 46.
See discussion by Joseph Pechman in Individual Income Tax Provisions of
the 1954 Code,NationalTax Journal, March 1955, pp. 120—122.
16Agendafor ProgressiveTaxation,pp. 47—48.
17Interms of present exemptions, both single persons and married couples
might each be granted abasic exemption of $600. But the exemption forPROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LiABILITY 59
This provision would be appropriate to meet both equity and effi-
ciency criteria. The latter, it will be recalled, concerns the possible dis-
tortion in allocation of a wife's time between home and labor market
when the income she generates is not taxable in both cases. Little is
known about the actual effect the income tax has had on the participa-
tion of women in the labor market.18 Probably more than any other
statistical efforts, those of Mincer and Cain, though not directed at the
effects of the income tax as such, throw light on this question. Mincer
shows, by use of cross-section data from the 1950 Census, that the
Labor force response of married women is negatively correlated with
husband's income, but positively with the wage rate for female workers
—indeed, that the latter is considerably stronger than the former.19
There is thus some statistical confirmation, at least with respect to
wives' behavior, of what theory has long suggested on a priori grounds:
that the income effect of a decrease in wage rate (increase in tax)
would tend to increase the supply of labor, but that the price effect
married couples, where both work outside the home, might be increased by 25
per cent of the smaller of the two earnings figures up to a maximum of $1,200.
In this case, a $2,400 income would be presumed to signify full-time employment
outside the home. There was a generalized working-spouse credit of this type in
the United States in 1944 and 1945, but its tax value had an upper limit of $15.
18 A paper by Clarence H. Long, "Impact of the Federal Income Tax on
Labor Force Participation," in Federal Tax Policy forEconomicGrowth and
Stability,Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Washington,1955, pp.
153—166, is largely devoted to searching for possible tax influences on the labor
force participation of wives. But Long's data are confined to the relation between
labor force participation of wives and annual income of husbands. They throw
no light on the effect of the tax on labor force participation. As Long himself
points out, "the computations...tellus nothing about how the earnings, and
the tax on earnings, of other family members besides the husband would influence
the decision of the wife to work" (p. 157).
'° Mincer's computations show that for a1per cent variation in median
income of male family heads (wife present) in Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas in1949, the labor force participation of wives in 1950 varied .83 per
cent in the opposite direction, but that for a1per cent variation in median
income of females, it changed 1.50 per cent in the same direction. See Jacob
Mincer, "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor
Supply," in Aspects of Labor Economics, Princeton for NBER, 1962, Table 1,
p.72. Cain, in a later and more extended study, notes that Mincer's major
finding "that, for wives, the positive wage effect exceeds the absolute value of
the negative income effect. ..wasweakened by my research but not over-
turned." Whereas Cain's results for 1950 tended to confirm those of Mincer, for
1940 and 1960 the confirmation had to be qualified in some respects. See Glen
G. Cain, Married Women in the Labor Force, Chicago, 1966, Chapters 3 and 4,
and especially pp. 84 and 117.60 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
would operate in the direction of diminishing it.20 It is reasonable to
assume that Mincer's and Cain's findings with respect to the labor force
response of wives to changes in wage rates can be expanded to include
a change in tax treatment of wives. An adjustment in tax so as to treat
wives' labor market income more symmetrically with income from work
in the home and leisure would presumably have an effect similar to an
increase in the wage rate.21
As has been indicated, under the income tax since 1948, wives' earn-
ings are treated as an addition to total family income. Hence, the higher
the latter (without the wife's money income), the higher the marginal
rate of tax applicable to her earnings and the greater the disparity in
treatment between labor market income, on the one hand, and home
labor and leisure on the other. Before 1948, i.e., before the introduction
of income splitting between husbands and wives, it was in their interest
to file separate returns if they had separate incomes, and therefore tax
rates on wives' incomes were independent of their husbands' incomes.
If wives' labor force participation was sensitive to these differences in
tax rates on their earnings, the differences would presumably be con-
firmed by an increase in covariation of husbands' and wives' earnings.
The higher a husband's income, under present income tax practice, the
higher must be the wife's market earnings to equal the cost of replacing
her work in the home plus the tax on her earnings.22 Mincer's data
(though presented for a different purpose) show indeed a rise in inter-
correlation between male and female earnings between 1940 and 1950.23
Current federal practice is to allow the deduction of a limited amount
of cash outlays made for the care of dependents. The dependent must
be a child under 13 years of age, or a person incapable of caring for
20 See,for instance,Lionel Robbins, "On The Elasticity of Demand for
Income in Terms of Effort," Economica, June 1930, pp. 123—129.
21 Cain reaches the same tentative conclusion regarding the effect of the per-
sonal income tax on market work of wives. Married Women, p. 122.
22 For years prior to 1948 a wife's breakeven income may be defined as
Wb = D =valueof wife's
services in the home, and .9r =taxrate on wife's income after allowance for
deductions equal to 10 per cent of earnings. The expression for years beginning
with 1948 is Wb =D
1.9rf'where rf =marginalrate of tax on family income
including wife's earnings.
23 "Labor Force Participation," p. 73, n. 10. The rise in correlation was from
r =.4in 1940 to r =.8in 1950.PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILITY 61
himself. The deduction has an upper limit of $600 per taxpayer for one
child or dependent and $900 for two or more children or dependents.
The taxpayer must have been "gainfully" employed when the expenses
claimed were incurred. Men may claim the deduction if widowed,
divorced, or if married to a woman who has been institutionalized for
at least ninety days. All employed women with eligible dependents may
claim the deduction, but a working wife may do so only provided she
files a joint return with her husband, and is required to reduce the maxi-
mum allowable by each dollar by which their joint income exceeds
$6,000.24
It is evident that the allowance is largely confined to (1) working
wives with children under 13 whose family income is below $6,900
for the year, and who incur cash child-care expenses large enough to
exceed, together with any other itemized deductions the family may
have, the amount allowed as a standard deduction; (2) widowed, di-
vorced, or legally separated persons with dependents to be cared for
while they work. Whenever child care is obtained through "unpaid"
family workers (older children, grandparents, etc.), no deduction is
allowed. For these reasons not many child-care deductions may be
expected. While there were 5.5 million working wives with children
under 12 in 1958,25 the number of returns with child-care deduction
was only 272,000 for 1960, or less than 6 per cent of the 1958 figure
(Table 21).26
The deduction has declined in total amount and frequency between
1956 and 1960, which is exceptional when compared to the sharply
rising trend in all other itemized deductions.27 Perhaps the most striking
feature is that of the small amounts involved—$0.1 billion compared
24 Thus, if a couple has one dependent, no deduction can be taken if their
joint income equals or exceeds $6,600; if there is more than one dependent it
vanishes at $6,900.
25 Henry C. Lajewski, "Working Mothers and Their Arrangements for Care
of Their Children," Social Security Bulletin, August 1959, p. 9.
26 The figures in the table are the result of the pre-1964 Act allowance, which
was somewhat more restricted than that available from 1964 on. The major
differences are:(1) the age limit for dependents other than those incapable of
caring for themselves was 12 rather than 13 years; (2) the deduction was limited
to $600 regardless of how many dependents were cared for; (3) the maximum
joint income at which an employed married woman may claim the full allowable
child-care deduction was raised from $4,500 to $6,000.
27 C. Harry Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax, Princeton
for NBER, 1960, Chapter 3.62 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
TABLE 21






of Re-Average On Returns of AG! of
turnsAmount with Child Claimants
Amount(thou-(col.I ±CareDe- On All (col.1 ±
Year Claimedsands)col. 2)duction Returns col. 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1954 88.0 273 322 1,164 229,221 7.6
1956 110.6 329 336 1,502 267,724 7.4
1960 103.1 272 379 1,332 315,466 7.7
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of income. (Column 4 estimated by multi-
plying income class averages of income for all returns by frequency of child care deduc-
tions.)
to total itemized deductions of $32.8 billion. Average child-care deduc-
tions have been less than $400, considerably below the modest limit
of $600. The explanation lies in the income limitation imposed on the
use of the deduction by married women. As is seen in Table 22, only
the $4,500—$6,000 income group had an average deduction ($347)
less than that for all returns ($379). The deduction vanished for mar-
ried women over the $4,500—$5,100 income range.
It can be concluded that the deduction in its present form is largely
directed toward the alleviation of hardship arising from the combination
of child-care expenses and low income experienced by some persons.
It relates primarily to the fact that the consumption of home-produced
goods and services tends to be a large part of total consumption for a
family with small children and low income. From an equity and effi-
ciency point of view, as has been seen, the problem exists for all fam-
ilies no matter what the size of their income. In principle, the fact that
child care and housekeeping may absorb much of the income of a
working woman does not call for a tax deduction. Substantially the
same problem would exist if income were imputed to those who con-
sume their own services in the home. In that case, the hardship suf-PROVISIONS AFFECTiNG EMPLOYEE LIABILITY 63
TABLE 22
AverageAmount andRelation to income ofChild Care Deduction,
byAG! Groups, 1960
Deduction
AG! Amount Number Average as Per-











15,158 39,822 381 16.2
3—4.5 41,107 107,896 381 9.9
4.5—6 22,729 65,578 347 6.8
6—10 20,105 49,821 404 5.6
10—25 3,727 8,366 445 3.5
25 andover 291 526 553 1.3
Totals 103,117 272,009 379 7.7






fered by a low-income working mother would be no different from that
of any person whose earnings in the market are insufficient to cover
what by current standards are considered necessities.
Earned Versus Unearned Income
Problems somewhat analogous to those concerning working wives (dis-
cussed in the preceding section) arise concerning income from work
in general. In recognition of the differences between income from per-
sonal effort and income from property, an explicit "earned-income"
credit was part of the tax law from 1924—31 and again from 1934—43.
The case for income tax differentiation between earned income and
income from property is in three parts,28 only the first two of which
28Allthree reasons mentioned below are discussed at length by Vickrey, and
much of the discussion is based on his Agenda for Progressive Taxation (see
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have been widely cited in its support. First, no allowance against in-
come from personal effort for the investment made in skill or intellec-
tual preparation to obtain such income exists similar to the depreciation
allowance granted those employing physical capital. Hence it is argued
that the income tax discriminates in favor of capital in the form of plant
and machinery, and against that in the form of education and training.
Second, income from work usually requires increases in living costs not
associated with income from property. An employed person needs to
live near his place of work, which often means increased costs of
housing. He also may have extra expenses for clothing, travel, and
meals, none of which are deductible. A person who lives on property
income exclusively has thus, in a very real sense, lower living expenses.
Such expenses as are associated with the management of his property
are allowed as business expense deductions. Third, the individual who
derives his income from property is better off by the amount of extra
leisure he enjoys than the one who derives his income from employment.
A person who seeks no income in the labor market thereby consumes
his own services, whether through home production or pure leisure.
Yet two such persons may pay identical amounts of tax if their respec-
tive money incomes are equal.
The lack of recognition 29inthe tax law of the three items discussed
must be ascribed in large part to the difficult identification problems
connected with them. Yet, of the three, investment in education and
training is probably the least difficult to measure—up to a point—and
also the most important on the score of neutrality in taxation. An allow-
ance could be made for it through amortization of explicit education
expenses, such as tuition fees, books, and travel. These can be written
off against the income earned by the taxpayer over an appropriate num-
29Actually,since 1958 education and training expenses have been deductible
if "primarily for the purpose of:(1) Maintaining or improving skills required
by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business, or (2) Meeting
the express requirements of ataxpayer's employer, or the requirements of
applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention by the
taxpayer of his salary, status, or employment." See Treasury Department, In-
structions for Form 1040, Statistics of Income, 1960, p. 141. As Richard Goode
has pointed out,"Ifasimilarattitude were taken toward physicalcapital,
deductions from taxable income presumably would be allowed for maintenance
expenditures and capital replacement costs, but would be denied for depreciation
on capital outlays intended to establish new firms, to enlarge existing enterprises,
or to introduce new products." See Goode, "Educational Expenditures and the
Income Tax," in S. J. Mushkin (ed.), Economics of Higher Education, Washing-
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ber of years, and this method seems more precise than any generalized
credit or deduction aimed at allowing for investment in education and
training. Goode has estimated that students' own current outlays for
tuition, books and supplies, and travel, but exclusive of the value of
scholarship aid received from private or governmental bodies, might
approach $3.1 billion by Depending on the time period over
which education expenditures were amortized, the level of annual de-
ductions would be lower than this figure for several years. In addition,
Goode estimates that at least one-tenth of the amount amortizable
would not be deducted because of wastage through death, and because
of women students who become housewives and who therefore have no
taxable income against which the investment may be written off. Assum-
ing a 25 per cent marginal tax rate for college-educated taxpayers, an
allowance for explicit education expenses would result in a revenue
cost of $700 million once annual write-offs reached the level correspond-
ing to 1969—70 private education outlays. As has been stressed by
others, the greater part of investment in education receives an auto-
matic, though unintended, immediate write-off in the form of forgone
earnings. Becker has estimated this indirect cost at roughly 75 per cent
of the total private cost of college education in the United States.3'
The same is true of substantially the entire cost of on-the-job training.
Since its value is not included in taxable income, it also is in effect
accorded an immediate write-off. Compared to other forms of capital
formation, investment in education and training may thus not be at as
great a disadvantage as appears at first when only explicit costs are
considered. 1t may of course be argued that forgone earnings are well-
nigh ubiquitous since leisure activities and work in the home also in-
volve forgone earnings. Those investing in education are therefore not
given an isolated advantage in the treatment of these earnings. Never-
theless, it can be argued that the greater the forgone-earnings compo-
nent in the total cost of an investment, other things equal, the more
favorable its tax treatment.
The "leisure" differential, and the difference in cost of living asso-
ciated with income from work, are more difficult to allow for. No
explicit payment corresponding to the value of leisure enjoyed by those
with property income exists. And differences in the cost of living di-
30Ibid.,pp. 284—295.
31GaryS. Becker, Human Capital, New York, NBER, 1964, P. 149.66 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
rectly associated with a job occur in so many subtle ways as to present
insuperable identification problems: housing, food, clothing, all may be
affected.
Yet the case is no more than an extension of the working-wife prob-
lem discussed in the preceding section. The solution found most con-
sistent there,it will be recalled, was to allow married couples an
exemption greater than that for single persons only if both had income
from employment, the second exemption to be allowed only to the
extent that the smaller of the two incomes approached the level pre-
sumed to indicate full-time employment. In order to make the treat-
ment of income from work in the labor market completely general
vis-à-vis all other income, one might extend the additional exemption
to all persons with such earnings up to a specified level. For married
couples, the provision that the allowance applies to "the smaller of the
two incomes" up to a specified level would be dropped. In effect, house-
wives and persons with income from property only would not receive
the earned-income credit. Thus, assuming a basic exemption of $600
and an earned-income credit limited to $600 per person, a married
couple, none of whose income was from personal services outside the
home, would obtain only one $600 exemption; a couple with one spouse
earning income outside the home would obtain an exemption of $600
plus an earned income credit limited to $600; and a couple in which
both spouses earned income outside the home would be entitled to
$600 plus two earned-income credits (in other words, a maximum ex-
emption of $1,800)Eventhis method makes only very crude allow-
ance for differences in leisure time available to different taxpayers.
Two wage earners with equal earnings but unequal rates of pay per
hour will enjoy different amounts of free time. Yet both will receive
the same earned-income credit. No simple credit device of the type
described can distinguish between employees who receive unequal
amounts of paid free time, such as vacations, coffee breaks, and lunch-
time, not to speak of the length of the workweek itself.
How close did the earned-income credits of 1924—31 and 1934—43
come to fulfilling the above three objectives? The credit for 1924 was
25 per cent of the tax on earned income. The latter was defined as any
earnings from employment or self-employment up to a maximum of
$10,000, but for every taxpayer a minimum of $5,000 was treated as
32Exemptionsfor dependent children would of course be a separate matter,
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"earned," regardless of source. For 1925—27 the maximum was raised
from $10,000 to $20,000, and for 1928—31 from $20,000 to $30,000.
That anyone could take the credit up to the first $5,000 of net income
gave it a peculiar twist, for this amounted, in essence, to a 25 per cent
tax cut on that amount of income. The "earned-income" credit was,
in effect, only a credit on earned income in excess of $5,000—very
much the opposite of what was suggested above as perhaps being ap-
propriate. The law seemed to say that an adjustment for income in the
form of leisure and home production, as well as amortization of invest-
ment in oneself, is a pressing matter at income levels above $5,000,
but not below.
The earned-income credit was not re-enacted during 1932 and 1933
"under demands for more revenue."Subsequent demands for rein-
statement were nearly unanimous in stressing, as the reason for the
credit, amortization of investment in professional education and train-
ing to the exclusion of the leisure and living-expense aspects.34 If amor-
tization of investment in human beings is accepted as the rationale for
the credit, the fact that it differentiated between "earned" and "un-
earned" only above a relatively high level of income would not neces-
sarily conflict with its aim. It might be presumed that the investment
aspect is unimportant for earned incomes of $5,000 or less, but be-
comes increasingly significant above this level.35 The earned-income
credit was indeed reinstated for 1934 in a form substantially similar to
the earlier one. The major change was that all incomes below $3,000
were treated as earned. If net income exceeded $3,000, earned income
was presumed to be at least $3,000 but not more than $14,000. The
credit itself equaled 10 per cent of the net income defined as earned,
but had to be used as a deduction from net income instead of a direct
offset against tax liability as before.
While its actual quantitative significance is now mainly of historical
interest, the fraction of the total credit which actually applied to earned
income above the minimum available to all taxpayers is noteworthy.
Table 23 separates for each year the amount of credit available to all,
regardless of source, from the amount of "true" credit (that is, the
See TheRevenueBill of 1934, House of Representatives, Report No. 704,
p. 6.
34Houseof Representatives, Revenue Revision, 1932, Hearings Before Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, pp. 184 and 364.
This may still leave inadequately explained the presumption that all income
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TABLE 23
Tax Value of Earned-Income Credit Allocated Between "True" Earned







Total and RegardlessCot. 2 ±
Yeara Credit Total Salaries of Source b Col.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1924 30,637 6,507 5,720 24,130 21.2
1925 24,570 15,552 13,417 9,017 63.3
1926 24,647 15,368 13,429 9,279 62.4
1927 24,915 15,908 13,965 9,005 63.8
1928 34,790 24,621 21,422 10,167 70.8
1929 22,062 18,671 16,331 3,392 84.6
1930 24,886 17,113 15,541 7,771 68.8
1931 17,491 11,987 11,037 5,504 68.5
1934 22,887 6,053 5,594 16,834 26.4
1935 27,424 7,524 6,954 19,900 27.4
1936 36,631 9,699 8,856 26,932 26.5
1937 42,201 11,140 10,217 31,061 26.4
1938 37,504 9,897 9,100 27,607 26.4
1939 47,352 11,638 10,646 35,714 24.6
1940 83,555 13,171 12,012 70,384 15.8
1941 158,004 16,965 15,176 141,039 10.7
1942 351,020 34,520 30,594 316,500 9.8
1943 509,671 50,148 44,092 459,523 9.8
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income. For 1924—31, the total in col.I
is as tabulated there. Cots. 2, 3, and 4 could be computed without difficulty from the
Treasury statistics since these are available by income groups below and above the
$5,000 net income level.
For 1934—43, only the net income equivalents of the credit were published, and the
tax equivalents were computed from the published data. The amount in col. 4 was ob-
tained by multiplying the normal tax rate by the sum of (a) the earned income credit on
alt returns with less than $3,000 net income and (b) the frequency times $300 for all re-
turns with net income over $3,000. The totals in column I were found by multiplying the
normal tax rate by the earned-income credit. The amounts in columns 2 and 3 were ob-
tained residually.
aNoearned-income credit was allowed for 1932 and 1933.
b1924—1931: all net income less than $5,000; 1934—1943: all net income less than
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amount conditional on the existence of earned income). In the first
period, 1.924—31, much of the total was true credit, except for 1924,
when the ceiling on income defined as earned was $10,000 and exemp-
tions were lower than for the other seven years. In the second period,
1934—43, the true credit was consistently and strikingly less than the
nominal credit. As exemptions were lowered, an increasing share of the
credit applied to income below $3,000 on which the credit was avail-
able regardless of source. In the last three years of its nine-
tenths of the credit was of the nominal type. It was precisely in these
terms that the credit's demise was viewed by the Secretary of the
Treasury:
As a step toward simpiffication of the individual income tax it was proposed
by the Treasury that the earned income credit be eliminated. The Treasury
did not oppose the objective of differentiation in favor of genuine earned
income. However, it took the position that for a large proportion of tax-
payers the credit was not a real earned income credit since the first $3,000
of net income was considered earned net income regardless of the source,
and that the view of the credit was out of all proportion to the complexities
which the credit produced in the computation of the tax.86
The latter part of the Secretary's statement is borne out by the statis-
tics in Table 24. After 1940 the earned income credit reduced total
tax liability (before credit) by less than 4 per cent, and at no time did
the reduction exceed 7 per cent. These figures include the amount avail-
able on all income regardless of source. If attention is restricted to the
reduction in tax liability on wages and salaries on account of the credit
in excess of the amount available regardless of income source (col. 2,
Table 21), its value is found to be less than 1 per cent of tax liability
on all wages and salaries after 1940. Only in the period 1928—3 1 did
that part of the credit reduce tax liability on wages and salaries by more
than 10 per cent. By 1943 it had declined to one-half of 1 per cent of
tax liabifity on wages and salaries.
Excludable Sick Pay
Since 1954, employees who are absent from work because of illness or
injury, and who continue to receive wages or salaries under an em-
ployer-financed wage continuation plan, may under certain conditions
36AnnualReport of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1943,p.87.70 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
TABLE 24
Reduction in Tax Liability as a Result of





Liability on Account of
Account of "True" Earned




















Source: Cot. 1: cot. 1, Table 23, divided by the sum of
col. 1, Table 28, and col. 1, Table 23, in per cent; cot. 2:
cot. 3, Table 23, divided by the sum of col. 2, Table 28,
and cot. 3, Table 23, in per cent.
Note: Years 1924—28 not shown separately in Table
28; Statistics of income used as source.PROVISIONS AFFECTiNG EMPLOYEE LIABILiTY 71
exclude such pay from taxable income at a maximum rate of $100 a
week. Any arrangement under which an employer undertakes to con-
tinue a sick employee's wages, including those in which there is simply
a policy of continuing to pay employees during illness, qualifies for the
"sick-pay" exclusion.37 Under the 1954 Act, payments for the first
seven calendar days of an absence on account of ordinary sickness were
not excludable. However, if there was at least one day of hospitaliza-
tion, or if the absence was due to injury, the exclusion applied from the
first day of absence.
Difficulties caused by, and objections to, the sick-pay exclusion led
President Kennedy and the Secretary of the Treasury to argue for its
repeal.38 A major objection, widely shared, was that the exclusion
placed a premium on absenteeism. An employee covered by a wage-
continuation plan may in many cases be better off financially when
slightly ill and at home than when at work, "and the employee who
stays on the job, even though ill or injured, is in effect penalized for
working."It was also argued that the exclusion tends to be unrelated
to medical hardship as such. An employee staying at home because of
a minor injury which requires little or no medical expense can exclude
up to $100 per week from his wages, whereas someone requiring ex-
pensive medical care, but continuing at work, has no similar exclusion.
In addition, there were problems of distinguishing between injury and
mere sickness. This made considerable difference, since there was no
exclusion for the first week of illness unless it could be classed as injury
or unless there was at least one day of hospitalization (the latter also
being a possible cause for abuse).
The sick-pay exclusion was modified under the 1964 Act, but not
repealed. Employees receiving less than 75 per cent of their regular
weekly wages while absent may exclude up to $75 a week from the
first day of absence if hospitalized for at least one day, or after seven
days if not hospitalized.40 If the employee is still absent from work• after
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 105(e).
See Committee on Ways and Means, President's 1963 Tax Message Along
with Principal Stateme pit,TechnicalExplanation and Supporting Exhibitsand
DocumentsSubmitted by Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, Washington,
1963, pp. 16 and 45.
p. 16.
40Theseven-day waiting period applies under the 1964 Act regardless of
whether the absenceiscaused by illness or injury,as long as thereis no
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TABLE 25
Frequency and A mount of Sick-Pay Exclusion Compared with Frequency
and Amount of Wages and Salaries Reported, 1954—64
(dollars in billions)
Sick-Pay
Exclusion Wages and Salaries Reported
Num- Num- Amount Percentages
ber of ber of on Re-
Returns Returns turns withCol. 1Col. 2Col. 2
(mu- (mu- TotalExclu- ÷ ÷ ÷
Year lions)Amountlions) Amount asiona Col.3Col. 4Col. 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1954 0.9 0.35 49.9 186.0 — 1.8 0.2
1955 1.2 0.44 51.3 200.7 — 2.3 0.2
1956 1.4 0.54 51.9 215.6 — 2.7 0.2
1957 1.4 0.57 52.6 228.1 — 2.7 0.2 —
1958 1.5 0.62 51.6 227.6 9.7 2.9 0.3 6.4
1959 1.6 0.68 52.9 247.4 10.7 3.0 0.3 6.4
1960 1.6 0.68 53.6 257.9 11.3 3.0 0.3 6.0
1961 1.6 0.76 54.0 266.9 11.8 3.0 0.3 6.4
1962 1.7 0.78 55.1 283.4 13.0 3.1 0.3 6.0
1963 1.9 0.88 56.3 299.4 14.6 3.4 0.3 6.0
1964 0.8 0.52 57.5 320,4 n.a. 1.4 0.2 n.a.
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income.
aNetof exclusion.
thirty days, the weekly excludable amount rises to $100 and is available
to any employee without regard to the level of his regular wages. The
limitations imposed under the 1964 Act caused a 60 per cent decline in
the number of returns filed with excludable sick pay and a 40 per cent
decline in the amount excluded (Table 25).
What has given rise to the present treatment of employer payments
to employees for time away from work because of illness? In the case
of employees who finance their own sick-pay plans, such payments may
be considered as properly excludable, although, strictly speaking, the
premiums rather than the benefits should be treated as costs.4' How-
ever, to the extent that plans are employer financed, the same cause for
4]. See Melvin I. White, "Consistent Treatment of Items Excluded and Omitted
from the Individual Income Tax Base," Tax Revision Compendium, Committee
on Ways and Means, Washington, Vol. 1, pp. 3 17—321.PROViSIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABiLiTY 73
exclusion does not exist, since employer contributions, though they con-
stitute imputable income to the employee, are already excluded from
his taxable income. To exempt both premiums and benefits might prove
to be one exclusion too many.
It cannot be said that Congress was entirely unaware of these prob-
lems when the provisions of the 1954 Revenue Code were drawn up.
In fact, the current practice existed long before 1954 with respect to
wage continuation plans financed through formal insurance contracts
by the employer. Only employers' informal, self-insured plans func-
tioned in a twilight zone of uncertainty with respect to the tax treatment
of benefit payments from them.42 Thus, though equal in substance,
benefit payments originating from formal insurance contracts were con-
sidered excludable from taxable income, whereas those made under less
formal arrangements were in most cases taxed to the employee as wage
or salary payments. In putting the current $100 sick-pay exclusion into
the Code, Congress very much had its eye on the latter inequity, but
did not attempt to solve the larger issue of whether any exclusion at
all is called for when the premium payments are not made outof the
beneficiary's taxable income.
The forgoing must be kept in mind when interpreting the published
statistics on the amount and income-size incidence of the sick-pay ex-
clusion. Where the arrangement for sick pay is a formal one, so that
the payments may be made through an insurance company, the amount
paid need not be reported as long as it does not exceed a weekly rate
of $100. No exclusion appears on the tax return in these instances.
Where wage continuation is not institutional, but simply a part of the
employer's policy or a combination of both, part or all of the sick pay
is included in the employee's withholding statement and thus needs to
be deducted on the tax return to make the exclusion effective. It is
therefore only this latter amount that has appeared in the statistics
under the heading of sick-pay exclusion.
This may in part explain why the relative frequency of returns with
sick-pay exclusion rises with size of reported annual income (Table 26).
A downward bias in annually reported income is ordinarily associated
with illness, since any loss in earnings capacity would tend to be re-
42Seethe discussion by Roy Wentz, "An Appraisal of Individual Income Tax
Exclusions," Tax Revision Compendium, pp. 329—333. Also House Report No.
1337, Internal Revenue Code, 1954, Washington, 1954, p. 15.74 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE iNCOME TAX
TABLE 26
Number of Returns with Sick-Pay Exclusion as Percentage of All













1964 1963 1964 1963 1964
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Less than 2 25 7 5,312 4,442 0.5 0.2
2—5 347 130 14,266 13,207 2.4 1.0
5—6 209 77 5,235 5,101 4.0 1.5
6—7 206 78 5,102 5,023 4.0 1.6
7—10 522 208 10,131 11,086 5.2 1.9
10—15 360 144 5,212 6,142 6.9 2.3
15 and over 118 52 1,860 2,216 6.3 2.3
Nontaxable 84 62 9,185 10,307 0.9 0.6
Totals 1,871 758 56,303 57,524 3.3 1.3
Source: Treasury Department, Statistics of Income.
flected in income.43 That the opposite tendency can be observed on tax
returns before and after the 1964 Act revisions may be explained in
two ways: First, among those persons whose employers continue to
pay wages and salaries, income may decline only very little or not at
all, so that the usual bias, described above, is largely eliminated. In
that case, what remains is the positive association of illness with age
and hence with annual income. Second, the type of wage continuation
payments tabulated in Table 26 may be more common for salaried
employees than for hourly paid workers. The latter may more fre-
quently receive sick pay under an insurance-company-administered plan,
or they may simply not be covered by wage continuation plans as fre-
quently as higher-paid employees.
Of the total number of returns with wages and salaries, only 1 per
See, for instance, Health Information Foundation, "The Economic Costs
of Absenteeism," Progress in Health Services, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1963. Here, more
work-loss days are found among persons with low than with high income.PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILITY 75
cent listed employer-provided (noninsured) sick pay for 1964 (Table
25). This sharp decline from 1963, when over 3 per cent of returns
with wages and salary had an explicit sick-pay exclusion, reflects the
restrictions imposed by the 1964 Act. In total amount, direct employer-
provided sick pay has been relatively small. In its first year, the reported
exclusion was $352 million; for 1963, $877 million; and for 1964, $522
million, or about 0.2 per cent of total reported wages and salaries in
1954 and 1964. For those reporting the exclusion, it amounted to about
6 per cent of wages and salaries in the period 1958—63.
Deferred Compensation
Employees, like property owners, have the option of deferring the
"realization" of some income. The quantitatively most important form
of deferral is the employer-financed retirement provision, although for
some strategic employees at the managerial level the provision of stock
options and of employment contracts, providing for continued compen-
sation at a stated rate for a stated number of years after termination of
regular employment, may be of even greater importance.
Employer contributions to a pension fund on behalf of employees
are not treated as current compensation for tax purposes, but must be
reported as retirement income at the time benefit payments are made.
Their omission from current taxable income understates the amount of
employees' compensation as reported on tax returns. Even though in-
come is eventually "realized," as employees become eligible for retire-
ment benefits, the postponement of realization to a time late in the
individual's life, when his earnings are relatively low, means that no
income is reported whenever a retired beneficiary's AGI falls below
the current filing A rough estimate for 1964 is that 64
per cent of benefit payments (net of cost) for that year were reported
on tax returns.45
The filing requirement for persons over 65 years old has been $1,200 in
recent years.
This ratio was obtained by dividing the amount of pensions and annuities
reported on tax returns for 1964 ($3.12 billion) by total estimated "benefit
payments to be reported" for 1964 ($4.86 billion). The latter estimate was
obtained by adding up benefit payments made in 1964 under private industry
group plans, individual annuity plans set up by life insurance companies, and
government retirement plans, and subtracting the amounts representing costs to
individual beneficiaries (Table F-2). Note that the pensions and annuities total76 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
Expressed in more general terms, postponing the realization of some
part of compensation through pension plans until late in life when earn-
ings tend to be low results in most instances in lower effective tax rates
on that compensation than if it had been treated as currently earned.
No less significant is the interest advantage which arises from the post-
ponement of tax on the employer's contributions to a pension fund and
the annual return earned on the fund's investments.
The difference between the effective rates on wages and salaries and
on pensions and annuities reported on tax returns for 1964 offers a
clue to the difference in tax on employer contributions arising from the
smaller income, and therefore lower tax rates, at the time of retirement.
The mean effective rate on reported wages and salaries of $320 billion
was 10.9 per cent. In contrast, the mean effective rate on reported pen-
sions and annuities of $3.1 billion for the same year was only 6.5 per
cent. More striking stillis the difference when the effective rates on
estimated total (reported and unreported) wages and salaries are com-
pared with those on pensions and annuities: the respective rates then
become 10.6 per cent and 4.2 per cent.46 If the treatment of savings
through retirement systems were on an accrual basis, some $9.4 billion
of employer contributions and $5.2 billionof investment income on
obtained from tax returns includes benefits from all kinds of plans, not only
those of retired employees. The coverage ratio given is therefore also more
inclusive than employer-sponsored group plans.
46Forthe rates on wages and salaries, see Table 28. Those on pensions and
annuities are computed, as shown in Appendix F, by dividing the tax liability
estimate for pensions and annuities by (a) reported pensions and annuities and
(b) total pensions and annuity payments.






State and local government retirement systems




For source, see notes to Table A-3, line 3a.
48Atthe end of 1964, total employee pension fund reserves in private industry
were $77.2 billion (SEC, "Private Noninsured Pension Funds, 1965," Statistical
Bulletin, June 1966, Table 2). Investment income for governmental retirement
systems is estimated at $1.6 billion for 1964. Investment income of corporate
noninsured pension plans was obtained from ibid. For insured corporate pension
funds the published asset figure (ibid.) was multiplied by the rate of earnings on
alllife insurance assets as compiled by the Institute of Life Insurance (Life
insurance Fact Book, 1965, p. 59). For governmental retirement systems, see
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government Finances
in U.S., Finances of Employee Retirement Systems of State and Local Govern-PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILITY 77
retirement fund assets would have been taxed to employees at an aver-
age marginal rate close to 22 per cent.4° Employer contributions to
retirement systems of all types have grown from 3.2 per cent of esti-
mated total compensation for 1955 to 4.8 per cent for 1964 (columns
1 and 3, Table 27)—a 50 per cent increase in relative importance—
although their level as such may be viewed as still modest.
As suggested at the beginning of Chapter 2, the exemption of em-
ployer contributions from taxation to the employee until retirement
benefits are received may be viewed as consistent with the realization
doctrine which prevails over most of the income tax. Accordingly, as
a general rule, income is not recognized until it is available to the tax-
payer in the form of cash, or its equivalent. As Goode points out,
"everyone would agree that if an employer deposited part of an em-
ployee's salary to his credit in a savings account, where it remained
at interest until the employee retired, this would not be a sufficient
reason for omitting that part of the salary from current taxable in-
come." 50Yetsome fully funded pension plans, which provide em-
ployees with vested rights to future benefits, may in essence not be very
different from Goode's hypothetical case. Presumably, the difference
between the two hinges on the extent to which the employee has access
to the savings accumulated on his behalf. The difference between the
simple case of income saved and deposited in a savings account, and
that of employer contributions to a pension plan becomes greater when
the latter does not provide for immediate vesting of the right to a pen-
sion, or for any vesting at all. In the absence of vesting, an employee
may receive no benefits from the employer-financed part of the plan if
he leaves his employer before retirement, despite his earlier participa-
tion in the plan. Many plans provide for no vesting, or vest the right
ments, 1964—65, January 1966,p.1, and Social Security Bulletin, Annual Sta-
tistical Supplement, 1964, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Table 12, p.11.
At a 22 per cent average rate (Table 33), the gross tax loss for 1964 was
$3.2 billion. Against this figure a tax gain of $0.20 billion on benefit payments
now taxable (Table F-i) must be offset. Thus, the net gain from taxing retirement
plan contributions and investment income currently would have been $3.0 billion
for 1964. The Treasury's estimate for 1966 was only $1.38 billion (see testimony
on private pension plans by Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
before Fiscal Policy Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, Washington,
May 16, 1966), a figure close to what we would obtain had the average effective
tax rate of 11 per cent been used.
5°SeeRichard Goode, The Individual Income Tax, Washington, 1964, p. 114.78 EMPLOYEECOMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
TABLE 27
Employer Contributions to Private and Public Pension Plans and Health
and Life Insurance as Percentage of Total Employee Compensation,
Selected Years, 1929—64
Other Retirement and Welfare Plans Total
Em-
ployer Retire- Health












1934 — .93 n.a. n.a. .93
1939 .61 3.11 n.a. n.a. 3.72
1944 .53 2.67 n.a. n.a. 3.20
1949 .58 3.34 n.a. n.a. 3.91
1952 .91 3.66 n.a. n.a. 4.57
1955 1.26 3.83 1.96 1.86 5.08
1956 1.25 4.12 2.15 1.97 5.37
1957 1.44 4.40 2.37 2.03 5.84
1958 1.42 4.56 2.45 2.11 5.98
1959 164 4.81 2.50 2.32 6.45
1960 1.93 4.99 2.53 2.46 6.92
1961 1.90 5.18 2.52 2.66 7.08
1962 1.94 5.50 2.52 2.97 7.44
1963 2.21 5.46 2.54 2.92 7.67
1964 2.16 5.42 2.62 2.80 7.58
Source: Table A-3.
aDetailmay notadd to total becauseof rounding.
to benefits only after completion of a stipulated period of service, say,
ten years.51
The existence of plans without vesting has been advanced as the
main reason for the present practice of excluding employer contribu-
tions and interest earned on pension-plan reserves from current AGI
in favor of including benefits less employee contributions later on. In
line with this reasoning, it might be appropriate to include employer
51 WalterW. Kolodrubetz, "Vesting ProvisionsinPrivate Pension Plans,"
MonthlyLaborReview,September1964, pp. 1014—1021.PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILITY 79
contributions and interest on pension reserves in AGI of employees
who acquire vested rights to benefits, but less so where rights are
not vested. In the latter case, it is argued, it is difficult to value such
rights because they are contingent on the employee's remaining in the
same job. Yet a requirement that employees include in AGI employer
contributions and interest accruals if their plans include vesting, and
otherwise not, would have the undesirable effect of discouraging vest-
ing, whereas public policy should, on other encourage it.
The current treatment may thus be preferred as the less objectionable.53
The presumed difficulty of determining the current value of contribu-
tions to nonvested plans may be considered the primary reason for the
present treatment of pension-plan contributions. But it may be argued
that a consistent application of the realization principle would require
that employer and employee contributions be treated alike. At present,
employee contributions are not deductible as a cost of obtaining future
income, whereas the employer's contribution, by not being included in
AGI, is in effect treated as such. By deducting all costs and taxing only
benefits, the realization doctrine would apply more uniformly than is
now the case.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the existence of plans
without vesting need not be considered an insurmountable obstacle to
valuing all contributions to, and interest on, pension funds currently.
In the case of vesting, an employee's equity in a pension fund clearly
increases with each employer contribution on his behalf. But even under
nonvested plans an employee receives something of value from his em-
ployer. What this value is cannot be determined for tax purposes with-
out adoption of some arbitrary rule. The rate at which the employer
"contributes" to the plan, although contingent on the employee's re-
maining on his job, may be used as indicative of what the latter receives.
Should the employee leave his employer before obtaining vesting, his
loss of pension rights can be treated as a capital loss and be deducted
accordingly.
Another, though different, form of deferred compensation is the em-
ployee stock option. A study of the tax treatment of employee com-
In the absence of vesting, employees forfeit their pension rights when they
change jobs, and such plans may thus discourage labor mobility. Vesting of rights
avoids this barrier to movement.
Foran exposition along these lines, see Goode, Individual Income Tax, pp.
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pensation would not be complete without some consideration of stock
options, although no exhaustive treatment is intended here. Stock op-
tions are of concern to a relatively small, though highly select and
important group of employees, and the problem of how to treat the
gain resulting from the exercise of options is too closely tied to the
capital gains problem to permit a full discussion here.54
Since 1950, capital gains treatment has been accorded to what are
termed "restricted" stock options. Typically, such options allow certain
corporation executives to purchase stock in their corporation within a
given period of time at a stipulated price, which, it is hoped, will be
substantially less than the market value of the stock at the time the
option is exercised. The gain is the difference between the cost to the
option recipient of the stock purchased and the price at which he may
dispose of it. The aim of according this gain the favorable capital gains
tax treatment is to encourage a proprietary interest in their business
among executive employees.
Executives holding stock options have thus an obvious strong interest,
in addition to any other motivations they may have, in seeing the price
of the stock of their corporation rise. Because of the favorable tax treat-
ment, there is also a strong incentive to obtain as much compensation as
possible in that form. Under the 1964 Act, the major restrictions im-
posed in order that gains realized from the exercise of options may
qualify for taxation at capital gains rates are: (1) option stock may not
be sold within three years of the date the option was exercised; (2) the
option price may not be less than 100 per cent of the stock's market
price at the time the option is granted, and the option must be exer-
cised within five years of that time; (3) the employee to whom an
option is granted must not be a "substantial" shareholder of the corpo-
ration. In the case of large corporations, a "substantial" shareholder is
any person holding 5 per cent or more of the voting stock. Prior to
1964, each of the forgoing restrictions was considerably milder. The
required holding period after exercise of an option was six months, not
three years; the option price could be as low as 85 per cent of market
Fordetailed treatments of these topics, see D. M. Holland and W. G. Lew-
ellen, "Probing the Record of Stock Options," Harvard Business Review, March-
April 1962, and George E. Lent and John A. Menge, "The Importance of Re-
stricted Stock Options in Executive Compensation," Management Record, June
1962; also, Lewellen, "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations,"
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value at the time the option was granted without forfeit of capital gains
treatment (although the amount from 85 to 95 per cent of market value
had to be treated as ordinary compensation if the stock was sold at
more than the option price); and in case of a sustained drop in market
price of the stock below the price at the time the option was granted,
the option price could be reset at a lower level.55
While in recent times stock option benefits have been of great im-
portance relative to regular salaries of executive employees, relative to
the aggregate of wages and salaries they have been of minor quantita-
tive importance. No precise data on the annual value of realized stock
option benefits are available. Lent and Menge, reporting on the option
benefits realized in a sample which comprised most of the industrial
and trade firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange with plans in
effect in 1957—58, calculated $200 million for 1959 and $164 million
for For all U.S. corporations, their rough estimate is $300—
$350 million a year for Next to total reported wages and
salaries of $258 billion for 1960 (Table 4), the total value of stock
options appears small. Moreover, in relative size there may well be a
decline in the amount of stock options, in view of the increased re-
strictions imposed under the 1964 Act.
Because of the existence of stock options as an alternative method
of executive compensation, figures in Table 15 are understated for re-
turns with AGI over $50,000. For this group of returns realized option
benefits amounted to roughly 30 per cent of ordinary salary.58 In some
cases, option benefits exceed salary.59 Yet the impressive size of realized
stock option benefits of top executives is not the major reason for the
sharp decline of wages and salaries relative to AOl of employees at
high income levels. The difference in the reported wages and salaries
and estimated AGI of high-income employees exceeds any plausible
estimate of the amount of realized stock option benefits. For employees
For a more detailed statement of the differences between the 1954 and 1964
Acts, see Treasury Department, Summaries of Provisions in the Revenue Act of
1964, Washington, March 1964, TP-26.
Lent and Menge, "Restricted Stock Options," p. 7.
Thisfigure was obtained informally from one of the authors.
58Ibid.,p. 12.
Holland and Lewellen found that in a sample of 166 executives in 31 of the
nation's 50 largest industrial corporations, a considerable number had option
benefits larger than their salaries for the period under consideration. See Holland
and Lewellen, "Record of Stock Options," p. 139.82 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
reporting AGI of $50,000 and over, the difference was close to $5
billion in 1961, as shown by the following figures(in millions of
dollars):




500 and over 57 894
SOURCE: Table B-i.
There is as yet (at least to our knowledge) no evidence as to how
effective stock options are in producing the desired results,i.e., "to
encourage better corporate management."Onthe basis of the histori-
cal record, it is not even clear that the stock option device has had the
effect of supplying a given amount of after-tax executive compensation
more cheaply for corporate employers than it could have been supplied
through conventional salary payments.6' But even if the cost ex post to
a company of paying a given amount of additional after-tax compensa-
tion were found to be the same by both methods, it could still be argued
that stock options, because their benefits are not known ex ante, have
greater incentive effects than equivalent amounts of salary. On this
question, there is at present no evidence.
Fringe Benefits and Expenses Incurred
at Convenience of the Employer
A variety of services are supplied by employers to employees free of
charge, some mainly as additional forms of compensation, known as
"fringe benefits," others mainly because they are consumed in the line
of duty and at the convenience of the employer. The latter are not
necessarily income to the employee. Goods and services often supplied
free include life insurance, medical care and hospital plans, "courtesy"
discounts, expense account perquisites, meals and lodging supplied on
60TreasuryDepartment, Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1964.
81SeeHolland and Lewellen, "Record of Stock Options," pp. 141—149. The
authors found that, since the cost to a corporation (stockholders) of granting
stock options is not a deductible expense in computing taxable income, whereas
conventional salary payments are, a given additional amount of after-tax com-
pensation could be achieved more cheaply (at pre-1964 rates) through salary
than stock options when an executive's ordinary income was less than $100,000.PROViSIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILiTY 83
the premises, reimbursement for moving expenses, and technical instruc-
tion away from the job.
As a general principle, payments by an employer on behalf of em-
ployees, if not in the nature of an employment-connected expense,
should be treated as compensation and included in AGI. Unless there
is an overriding social preference for the type of payment in question,
failure to include it in AGI is likely to result in inequities and economic
distortions. The tax law as a rule requires inclusion in AGI of personal
expenses of employees when paid for by employers, but there are major
exceptions. Premiums paid by employers to group medical, hospital,
and life insurance plans as well as unemployment insurance are not
included in AGI, nor are the benefits resulting from these plans. "Cour-
tesy" discounts on company-produced goods and the value of meals
furnished on the premises are also generally not treated as taxable in-
come. The estimated value of these exceptions was included in the
"total compensation" series shown earlier (Table 4). Premiums for
health and life insurance in 1964 are estimated at $6.1 billion and
company discounts and miscellaneous other fringe benefits, such as
meals on the premises, at $1.5 billion.62 Whereas premiums paid by
employers might be included in employees' AOl without particular diffi-
culty, discounts and employer-furnished meals have in practice been
omitted, mainly on administrative grounds. The former are usually small
and hard to detect. The latter may be difficult to value and are furnished
more or less at the convenience of the employer.
Some employees may receive compensation in the form of payment
for personal expenses under expense-account arrangements. The extent
to which this may be the case is not known and is difficult to estimate.
Reimbursed expenses while traveling away from home need not be
included in AGI, and if not reimbursed may be deducted in computing
AGI. Such travel is clearly at the employer's convenience and necessi-
tates outlays which might otherwise not have been undertaken, but
must also include an element of expense which would have been in-
curred in any case and which therefore constitutes income. Cases of
generous vacation fare and entertainment, paid for by employers osten-
sibly to permit employees to attend business conventions and confer-
62 For items included in health and life insurance premiums, see notes to line 3b
of Table A-3, items E—I. For company discounts and miscellaneous other items,
see lines 5 and 6, Table A-3.84 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
ences, or to entertain customers, have from time to time been a matter
of concern to the Treasury.63 The utility to the employee of compen-
sation in this form can easily be exaggerated, for even though one's
ticket to a musical comedy may have been paid for by the employer,
it may not be income to one who hates music. But because it is income
for some, the law at present may be said to lean in favor of the rela-
tively small number of individuals who can avail themselves of expense
accounts. There appears to be no simple solution to this problem.64
For the majority of employees, the balance may be in the opposite
direction. Except for those to whom food, lodging, or clothing are
directly supplied by the employer—and therefore usually deemed to be
at the employer's convenience and excluded from AGI °5—many find
their employment-connected expenses not deductible. This is especially
true in cases where employees incur additional expense for clothing,
food, and travel for which deductions from AGI would be exceedingly
difficult to allow, for in all these cases a substantial personal consump-
tion component is present. Only where the personal consumption com-
ponent is minimal does the tax law now permit employees a "business"
deduction: specialized clothing and tools required in an occupation,
union and professional association membership fees, subscriptions to
professional journals, and employment agency fees, among others. They
are part of the "miscellany" included under personal deductions from
AGI,6° and their exact amount is therefore not known. They could not
For instance, see President's Tax Message Along with Supporting Statement,
Detailed Explanation, and Supporting Exhibits and Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961, PP. 10, 38, and 72.
64AsGoode has pointed out, rigorous measurement of net income from per-
sonal effort is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, because of the dualrole of
human beings as both productive agents and consumers. for employees,
consumption can be both the end of production and the intermediate good. See
Goode, individual Income Tax, p. 78.
85Asa general rule, the monetary worth of payments in kind must be reported
as income by the employee. For instance, where housing is supplied to employees
at the latter's option, with equivalent reductions in wages or salaries, the value of
these services must be included in AGI. However, such pure cases are rare. More
common instances are those where consumption of services on the premises, such
as meals or lodging, has a value to the employer but may vary in value to the
employee from zero up to the actual market value of the services. Because of the
difficulty of separating employer's from employee's benefits in order to arrive at
imputable income, current practice is to presume all services thus furnished as be-
ing at the employer's convenience, and no imputation of income is made.
66Althoughnot "personal," and therefore not properly part of AG!, they are
included in the personal deductions category for administrative reasons.—
PROVISIONSAFFECTING EMPLOYEE LIABILiTY 85
have exceeded $4.9 billion in 1964, the total of pérsozial
deductions for that year. Because of their inclusion under personal de-
ductions, many employees have been prevented from job-
connected expenses as long as they chose the standard deduction.67
However, unreimbursed travel expenses of employees away from home
have been deductible in the computation of AGI, but may in many
instances have been included by taxpayers in miscellaneous personal
deductions, at least before 1964. Beginning in that year, a specific entry
on the form provides for "employee business consisting of
transportation and other travel expenses not paid for by employers, to
be deducted from gross income. Thus tabulated explicitly for the first
time, employee travel and transportation expenses amounted to $2.2
billion in 1964 and were claimed by 2.2 million, or about 4 per cent,
of taxpayers with wages or salaries.68 The deduction of unreimbursed
travel expenses separately from other employee business expenses is
arbitrary and part of an attempt to hold the line against further erosion
of the standard deduction's function to provide a simple tax return.69
For the same reason that daily commuting costs to and from one's
place of employment are not treated as a deductible expense, the tax
law until 1964 did not permit deduction of the expense of moving one's
household because of a change in employers. In both instances, personal
and "business" expense are closely intertwined. The tax law has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the distance one has to travel to work
depends on one's choice of location, which may be a function of per-
sonal preferences and not an "ordinary and necessary" part of one's job.
While it is thus true that a person may have to travel far to get to his
place of work, it can also be argued that he only travels far because he
chooses to live far from work. The same reasoning appears to have justi-
fied the treatment of moving expenses in the past: a person may have
moved because he changed jobs, in which case the expense of moving
justified a deductible expense. But a person also might have moved
mainly to gain a preferred geographical location and his change of jobs
SeeC. Harry Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax, Prince-
ton for NBER, 1960, P. 9.
68See Statisticsof Income, 1964, Preliminary Individual Income Tax Returns,
p. 3. Before 1964, this expense category was deductible from wages and salaries
in computing AGI. Thereafter it was still deducted in computing AGI, but not
from wages and salaries. A spurious rise in tabulated wages and salaries is thus
likely to have resulted after 1963 because of this change in reporting.
69Kahn,Personal Deductions, pp. 162—172.86 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION UNDER THE INCOME TAX
would have been merely incidental to the move. In this case, its cost
could not be justified as a deductible expense. Only when a person
moved his household because of a transfer to a new location within the
same firm was it presumed that the expense was genuinely at the con-
venience of the employer, provided the latter reimbursed the employee.
If an employer reimbursed a newly hired employee for moving expenses,
the reimbursement was treated as income.70
Under the 1964 Act, the treatment of moving expense has been
greatly liberalized. All employees who migrate to a new place of em-
ployment, whether for the same or a new employer, may deduct the
expense of travel and of moving household goods if not reimbursed.71
If reimbursed, the employee may exclude the amount of reimbursement
from gross income. So as not to bury entirely the old concern over
allowing deduction of expenses incurred for personal reasons, the 1964
law requires (1) that the new place of employment be at least twenty
miles farther from the employee's former residence than was his old
place of employment, and (2) that in case of a nonreimbursed move,
the taxpayer be employed in the general location to which he moved
for at least thirty-nine weeks during the year following arrival. The
liberalization in the treatment of moving expenses is primarily the result
of a change in public attitude toward labor mobility rather than a
revision of the consensus on equity. It reflects the concern of 1964
70 Wages and salaries as tabulated by the Commerce Department do not include
reimbursed moving expenses' as a general rule. Therefore, where such reimburse-
ments had to be reported as compensation on the return, a very slight overstate-
ment of the coverage ratio, as shown in col. 4, Table 4, must have resulted on
that account. The overstatement is likely to be slight because reimbursement is
relatively rare for new employees. Even if all those who migrated in order to
accept a new job had been reimbursed at an average rate of $200 per move, the
estimated total of wages and salaries of $291.4 billion for 1962 would have been
increased by merely $0.16 billion. This estimate was obtained by (a) multiplying
the civilian, noninstitutional labor force of 71,854,000 for 1962 (Economic Report
of The President, January 1963, p. 194) by the percentage of the male, non-
institutional, civilian labor force which migrated in 1962 to take a new job (1.4
per cent; see Samuel Saben, "Geographic Mobility and Employment Status,"
Monthly Labor Review, August 1964), which results in an estimate of 820,000
migrating to take new jobs; and (b) multiplying the estimate in (a) by an assumed
average cost of moves to new locations of $200, which gives an estimated moving
cost of $165 million for that group. The assumed average moving cost is based
on J. B. Lansing, E. Mueller, W. Ladd, and N. Barth, The Geographic Mobility
of Labor: A First Report, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1963, Table IV-34.
7i The deduction may be claimed whether a taxpayer itemizes or takes the
standard deduction. Discriminatory treatment between reimbursed and nonreim-
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for "persons living in depressed areas and those out of work due to
technological advance." 72 In its first year, the new deduction totaled
only $93 million, claimed on 290,000 returns. Taxpayers in the $2,000—
$5,000 AGI group claiming moving expenses deducted an average of
$227; those with AGI of $15,000 or more, $618 on average.78
The instances discussed illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing at
times between payments that constitute additional compensation and
payments that are in essence reimbursements for expenses at the con-
venience of the employer. In some cases a presumption that the latter
is the case is reasonable, as in the 1964 Act with respect to the treat-
ment of moving expenses. In others the opposite presumption would
be reasonable, as in the case of employer contributions to life and health
insurance plans. But in a third area, loosely described as expense
account perquisites, not even reasonable presumptions are feasible.
Conclusion
Of the several special provisions affecting the tax liability on employ-
ment income, which are considered in detail above, some have applica-
bility to relatively few employees, to whom they may be of great impor-
tance, although their significance in the aggregate is minor. Cases in
point are long-term gains derived from stock options, often considered
an important form of compensation for top executives, but estimated
to amount to no more than $0.3 billion in 1960, and the so-called
child-care allowance for working mothers, which totaled only $0.1
billion in 1960. These are indeed small figures next to reported wages
and salaries of $258 billion. Yet they both raise issues far more impor-
tant than their immediate effect on total tax liability. In the one case
the tax treatment of possibly the most strategic group of employees is
at issue. In the other, the limited present allowance for child care opens
up the much greater issue of the tax treatment of women in the labor
force compared to those working in the home.
Of much greater aggregate quantitative importance is the treatment
of deferred compensation and various types of consumption enjoyed
"at the convenience of the employer." The former consists largely of
employer contributions to social and private pension systems. For 1964,
72 Treasury Department, Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1964, TP-12.
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these amounted to about $17.4 billion, and none of them is treated as
currently taxable income; only private pension benefit payments are
treated as part of taxable income. But because retirement benefits are
typically received when annual money income is low, the tax on this
part of compensation is in effect very low. Consumption at the conven-
ience of the employer and various fringe benefits are not counted as
income to the employee. Their combined total may have exceeded $3.7
billion in While there is little disagreement on purely conceptual
grounds that these items in varying degree constitute compensation, and
therefore taxable income, to the employee, they are nevertheless omitted
from AGI because of the practical difficulty of measuring their value. It
is almost impossible to divide with any precision the value of services
furnished to employees on the job between business expense and income
in kind.
Current withholding of tax, which has so far been applied only to
wages and salaries, as distinguished from quarterly declarations of esti-
mated tax required for all other income, has on the whole resulted in
earlier tax payments by employees than by nonemployees. This is be-
cause employees on average are found to require refunds of tax at the
time of filing, whereas others, on average, are required to make some
additional payment signifying that their current payments have been
insufficient. However, the net burden placed on employees by this dif-
ference in timing of tax payments was found to be small.
Although there is at present no write-off allowance for investment in
education and training, such an allowance in somewhat indirect form
was apparently intended during two earlier periods under the title of an
earned-income credit. Its demise, contrary to the frequent tendency to
liberalize existing allowances, resulted primarily from a widespread rec-
ognition that the particular form in which it existed from 1934—43 bore
little relation to its purpose. In the light of recurrent interest in the tax
treatment of investment in education and training, an extended exami-
nation of this earlier experience seemed warranted.
This was the estimated total for income in kind (Table A-2), company dis-
counts, and miscellaneous other payments (Table A-3) in 1964.